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LONG ARM JURISDICTION
IN NORTH DAKOTA

I.

INTRODUCTION

Eight years ago, a student writer suggested that a "long-arm
statute," which is also known as a "single act statute," be enacted
in the state of North Dakota. In 1969, such a statute, which extends
the jurisdiction of the state's courts over nonresident individuals and
foreign corporations, was adopted by the North Dakota Legislature,2 and in June of 1971 the provisions of the statute were incorporated by the North Dakota Supreme Court into the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure. - By the time North Dakota enacted its
long-arm statute, at least 35 other states already had approved similar statutes. 4 The neighboring states of Minnesota, 5 South Dakota, 6
and Montana7 all extended the jurisdiction of their courts in this
way.
Although long-arm jurisdiction has been vested in North Dakota
courts for six years, the statute has been subjected to only a few
tests, leaving unanswered a number of questions about its scope and
the requirements of due process.
1. Note, A Single Act Statute for North Dakota, 43 N.D.L. REV. 299 (1967).
2. N.D. SEss. LAws or 1969, codified as N.D. CENT. Coon § 28-06.1-02 (Superseded
1971). All citations to the N.D.R. Civ. P. in this article are to the rule prior to January 1,
1976 unless otherwise indicated.
3. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b)(2). It reads:
(2)
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who
acts directly or by an agent as to any claim for relief arising from the
person's
(A) transacting any business in this state;
(B) contracting to supply or supplying services, goods, or other things in
this state;
(C) committing a tort within or without this state causing injury to another
person or property within this state;
(D)
committing a tort within this state causing injury to another person or
property within or without this state;
(E)
owning, or having any interest in, using, or possessing property in this
state;
(F)
contracting to insure another person, property, or other risk within this
state; or
(G) acting as a director, manager, trustee, or officer of a corporation organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within,
this state.
4. Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 1201, 1204-0& (1968).
5. Mnm.STAT. ANN. § 303.13(1)($) (1969).
6. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-7-2 (1967).
7. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 4(B).
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II.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-ARM STATUTES
A.

EARLY PERSPECTIVES

Civil actions are generally classified as either in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem." Actions in personam settle rights and duties between the parties; actions in rem declare the rights of all the
world to specific property within the jurisdiction of the court; and
actions quasi in rem settle the rights of the parties to the property
in question.9
Actions in personam have raised the most serious problem as
far as state court jurisdiction is concerned because they involve
the effect to be given the personal service of process outside the limits of the state where the action is pending. Most of the challenges
to extended jurisdiction are based on fourteenth amendment due process considerations.10 Such challenges do not typically arise in the
classic and usual method of obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant's person by serving process (the summons and complaint) upon
him personally within the state in which the action is brought.11
The extent to which federal due process restricts state jurisdiction over nonresident individuals and foreign corporations is considered a question of federal law.' 2 The issues are determined largely
on the basis of United States Supreme Court opinions, which historically have limited long-arm jurisdiction, but which more recently
have demonstrated a broad acceptance of long-arm statutes.
Illustrative of the early decisions is Kendall v. United States, 3
in which the Supreme Court declared that "No court can, in the ordinary administration of justice, in common-law proceedings, exercise jurisdiction over a party unless he shall voluntarily appear, or
is found within the jurisdiction of the court, so as to be served with
process." Later, in the famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff,14 the Court
held that a state court could not obtain in personam jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant simply by serving process upon him outside
the forum state or by publication.
The states, which were at the time of Pennoyer considered comparable to nations for jurisdictional purposes, 15 conformed almost
eagerly to the early proclamations of the Court. For example, the
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note (1942).
9. For a general analysis of in personam and in rem relief, see F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL
PaUmmus § 1.8 (1965).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that, "No State shall . . . deprive any person
"
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
8.

11.

G. STEVENS,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE

(College of Law, University

of Iowa, Iowa City. Iowa).
12. See, e.g., Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n., 289 Ill. 99, 124 N.E. 355
(1919), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 499 (1919).
13. 87 U.S. (12 Pet.) 526 (1838).
14. 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877).
15. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).

NOTES

Louisiana Supreme Court declared as repugnant to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment a statute that expressly authorized service of process to be made personally on either nonresidents
or its own citizens temporarily absent from the state, and that
allowed judgments in personam to be rendered.16
It quickly became clear, however, that the traditional bases of
jurisdiction over individuals-presence, 1 7 actual consent,, and domicile' 9-were insufficient to deal with the expanding commercial
complexity and population mobility found in the United States, and
that a wider jurisdictional basis was needed to offer the desired degree of protection from alleged wrongs committed by nonresidents
and foreign corporations.
B.

RESPONSE TO MODERN COMPLEXITIES

With the introduction and widespread use of the automobile in
the United States, the problem of lack of personal jurisdiction became
especially acute. An automobile operator could injure a person in
another state and leave before service of process could be made upon
him within that state. The apparent solution to this difficulty was
nonresident motorist statutes, which declared that use of a state's
highways by a nonresident motorist amounted to the granting of consent by him for a state official to act as his attorney upon whom
process could be served in any action arising out of any accident in
which he was involved. 20 The first such statute was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in 1916,21 one year after the Court had
considered and sustained the broad power of a state to control the
use of motor vehicles upon its highways. 22 The leading nonresident
motorist statute decision was Hess v. Pawloski,23 in which the Court
held that the Massachusetts statute did not conflict with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendement. The Court said that the
statute "makes no hostile discrimination against non-residents but
tends to put them on the same footing as residents. Literal and precise equality in respect of this matter is not attainable; it is not re24
quired."
16. Altmann v. Sanderson & Porter, 122 La. 265, 47 So. 600 (1908).
17. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
18. See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1855).
19. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
20. In upholding the -validity of nonresident motorist statutes, one court said that the
forum state was pursuing the "public interest" in protecting its citizens from the operation, by nonresidents, of motor vehicles within the forum. See Hess v. Pawloskl, 274 U.S.
352. 356 (1927).
21. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
22. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
23. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
24. Id. at 356.
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C.

CORPORATIONS

Peculiar problems involving in personam jurisdiction developed

where foreign corporations were the defendants. While domestic corporations could be sued on any cause of action within the forum

state, the traditional view held that corporations were artificial
persons existing only within the territorial boundaries of the state

in which they were chartered. 25 But over the years, several approaches were devised to make foreign corporations amenable to service of process.
1.

Consent Theory

The most common jurisdictional approach was to make such
a foreign corporation's consent to be sued a condition of its con-

ducting business in the state. The justification for this approach was
that a corporation lacked an inherent right to do business in the

state because it was not a citizen within the privileges-and-immunities clause of Article IV of the Constitution. 26 The consent, of course,
27
was fictional.
2.

Doing Business Test

Another jurisdictional approach that developed was the "doing
business" test-i.e., jurisdiction would stand if the foreign corporation was discovered to be "doing business" within the forum state
to such an extent as would justify holding it liable in damages for
any wrongs committed therein. The problem with this test was in
determining just what activity was adequate to constitute "doing
business" in the forum jurisdiction, thus making the foreign corporation amenable to process. It was generally recognized that single or
isolated transactions did not constitute "doing business, ' 28 nor was
a foreign corporation "doing business" when an officer of the corporation happened to be present in the forum state. 29 In addition, a for25. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
26. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168 (1868).
-27. The fictional consent theory was applied even when the foreign corporation did not
appoint an agent to receive service of process, as required by statute. This was done to
avoid giving a more favorable position to a corporation that did not comply with the
statute.
28. See for a discussion of single or isolated transactions, Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing
Business, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 1018, 1028-29 (1925). See also Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson,
118 U.S. 727, 735 (1884), where the Court said that a foreign corporation could be considered "doing business" in Colorado only if its purpose was to pursue or carry on business therein; therefore, a single contract entered into by the corporation was not "doing
business" within the meaning of the Colorado constitution and corporation statute.
29. See, e.g., Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915).
The Court declared:
"[I]t is indubitably established that the courts of one State may not without
violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, render a
judgment against a corporation organized under the laws of another State
where such corporation has not come into such State for the purpose of doing
business therein, or has done no business therein, or has no property therein.
or has no qualified agent therein upon whom process may be served; and
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eign corporation was initially not deemed "doing business" if its

agent solicited offers in the forum state that were subject to later
acceptance or rejection by the home office. 80
3.

Fair Play and Substantial Justice Test

In 1945, long-arm jurisdiction was substantially expanded by the
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,,3 1 where the state
of Washington had sought to collect from International Shoe Company

contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. Salesmen from the corporation had exhibited samples of the company's
merchandise within the state and had solicited orders from prospective buyers to be subsequently accepted or rejected at its home office outside the state. Althougb the activities were systematic and
on-going, 32 and created a large volume of business, the corporation
did not maintain an office in Washington and made no contracts
either for the sale or purchase of merchandise therein.
The Supreme Court found that the activities carried on by the
corporation established sufficient "minimum contacts""3 to permit
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Washington courts without violat-

ing the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. In
so holding the Court laid down the "fair play and substantial jus-

tice" test,-4 to be applied when weighing long-arm jurisdiction against
the requirements of the due process clause. The Court said:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose

of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not con-

template that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which

the state has no contacts .... 35
In adopting the "fair play and substantial justice" test, the Court
rejected the idea that a foreign corporation must engage in a fixed
the mere fact that an officer of the corporation may temporarily be in the
State or even permanently reside therein, if not there for the purpose of transacting business for the corporation or vested with authority by the corporation to transact business In such State, affords no basis for acquiring jurisdiction or escaping the denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
which would result from decreeing against the corporation upon a service
had upon such officer under such circumstances."
Id. at 194-95.
30. See, e.g., Green v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
31. 326 U.S. 910 (1945).
32. In the years in question (1937-40), International Shoe employed 11-13 salesmen.
who resided in Washington and confined their principal activities to that state. They were
under direct supervision and control of the company's sales managers in St. Louis, and
they were compensated by commissions. Id. at 313.
93. The Court said that due process "requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it . . ." Id. at 316.
34. Id.
85. Id. at 319.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

amount of, or certain types of, activity in order to be "doing business" within the forum state. In Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 6 the new test was applied to prohibit a foreign corporation
from selling certificates of insurance to Virginia residents without
first obtaining the state's permission as required by statute. Under
the statute, a precondition for obtaining a permit was that the corporation had to appoint the secretary of state as its agent for service of process in suits filed by state residents. The statute also provided for service by registered mail where service could not otherwise be obtained. The Court concluded:
[I]f Virginia, is without power to regulate this Association
to accept service of process on the Secretary . . . the only
forum for injured certificate holders might be Nebraska
[where the association was incorporated and its office located]. Health benefit claims are seldom so large that
Virginia policyholders could afford the expense and trouble of
a Nebraska law suit. . . . And prior decisions of this Court
have referred to the unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of
permitting policyholders to seek redress only in some distant
state where the insurer is incorporated. The Due Process
Clause does not7 forbid a state to protect its citizens from
such injustice.3
a.

Single Insurance Contracts

Seven years later, the Court, in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,-3 sustained jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on
the basis of a single insurance contract entered into by the corporation and a California resident. The petitioner in McGee had sued
the foreign insurance company on a claim and obtained a judgment,
process having been served by registered mail sent to the company's
principal place of business in Texas. The Court concluded that the
due process clause did not preclude the imposition of a judgment on
the company since the suit was based on a contract that had a substantial connection with California. 3' The Court also made note of
the movement toward expanded jurisdiction over nonresidents and
foreign corporations, and explained the trend in the following manner:
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across
state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
S6. 389 U.S. 643 (1950).
37. Id. at 648-49.
38. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
89. Id. at 223.

.NOTES
sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."0
b. Deliberate Acts
In 1958, just a year after McGee, the Court took what appeared
to some observers to be a cautious step backward in its role in expanding in personam jurisdiction. Hanson v. Deckla,'1 presented the
issue of whether the state of Florida had jurisdiction over a Delaware
corporate trustee, thus enabling the Florida courts to decide the validity of a trust agreement made by a settlor who moved to Florida
after executing the trust in Delaware. The Court held that the Florida courts could not determine the validity of the agreement because
the corporate trustee did not solicit or transact any business in
Florida, did not maintain an office therein, and did not administer
any truit assets in the state. The Court declared that there must be
some act by which the defendant has deliberately availed itself "of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. ' '42 Hanson might
thus be cited for the proposition that long-arm jurisdiction should be
extended to those cases in which the defendant's association with the
forum state is based on his voluntary activity. However, this might
be reading too much into the decision, for it is equally as likely that
the Court concluded that the contacts in the case were simply too insignificant to warrant jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed its
deposition that the application of the "minimum contacts" 4rule
3
pends upon the quality and nature of the defendant's activity.
c.

Testing Sufficiency of Contacts

The question of what amounts to a sufficient minimum contact
or contacts was discussed by the Ninth Circuit in L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, Inc.,- wherein the court applied a
three-part test 45 based upon a combined reading of International
Shoe, McGee, and Hanson. The court said that once a sufficient minimum contact is established, such contact will support jurisdiction if
in accordance with the due process concepts of "fair play" and "substantial justice," even if the contact consists of a single act or trans46
action by the nonresident defendant.
40.

Id.

at 222-23.

41. 357 U.S. 235 (1958), reh. denied, 358 U.S.' 858 (1958).
42. Id. at 253.
43. Id.
44. L_ D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1969).
45. Id. at 774-76. The test is basically as follows: (1) the defendant must do some act
or consummate some transaction within the forum; (2) the cause of action must arise
out of or result from the defendant's activities within the forum; and (3) once the "minimum contacts" have been established by applying (1) and (2), the jurisdiction based
thereon must be consistent with "fair play" and "substantial justice."
46. Id. at 773.
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D. SUmMARY
A review of the leading cases involving in personam jurisdiction
over nonresidents shows that such jurisdiction has indeed come a
long way-from the rags of Pennoyer to the relative riches of Iviternational shoe and subsequent cases. An arm that was once very
short has grown considerably, with the result that today certain "minimum contacts"-such as a single insurance contract or solicitation
of orders in a state even though the defendant maintains no office
therein-are deemed adequate to sustain jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants.
One writer has suggested that the following elements are factors
that should be considered in testing the validity of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents for causes of action arising out of their
contacts with the forum state: 47
1. Some governmental interest. "The activities of the defendant
which precipitated the suit must be of such a nature that the forum
state has an interest either in regulating them or in some way exercising a slight degree of control over them."' '
2. Trial convenience. The forum state must be in a favorable
position with regard to the relative convenience of the parties and
49
the court.
3. A purposeful act of the defendant. "There must be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the benefits
and protections afforded him by the laws of the forum state." 50
III.

NORTH DAKOTA JURISDICTION BEFORE THE LONG-ARM

STATUTE
A.

EARLY VIEWS ON "DOING BUSINESS"

North Dakota had no long-arm statute prior to 1969, but it did
have the Business Corporation Act, 51 which provides for service of
47.

Towe,

Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents and Montana's New Rule 4(B),

24

MONT. L. REv. 1, 13-16 (1962).

48. Id. at 13. See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623 (1935).
49. Towe, supra note 47, at 15. See also Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d
673 (1957) (on the facts, no inconvenience to defendant) ; Compania de Astral v. Boston
Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955) (place of
residence of parties).
50. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-10 (1974) provides in part:
Whenever a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State
shall fail to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this state, or whenever
any such registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the
registered office, or whenever the certificate of authority of a foreign corporation shall be suspended or revoked, then the secretary of state shall be

NOTES

process on foreign corporations "transacting business" in the state. 52
Although this statute has never been construed as a long-arm statute
in the traditional sense, it is said to have "all the qualities of a Sin' ' 58
gle Act statute.
It has been suggested that the reason the Business Corporation
Act was not viewed by the courts as a long-arm statute was because
of the "conservative view that North Dakota has towards 'doing business' in the state.1 54 However, another reason might be that a court
would be stretching the act beyond legislative intent by construing
55
it as a long-arm statute.
Most of the early cases in North Dakota concerning in personam
jurisdiction over nonresidents involved corporations and the issue of
whether they were "doing business" in the state. While decisions

prior to 1930 generally favored the corporate defendants, some of
the decisions since that time have indicated support for expanded

jurisdiction, while others have continued to adhere to the early, conservative views.
1.

Single Transaction

A 1906 decision placed North Dakota in line with the traditional
rule that a single or isolated transaction by a foreign corporation
does not constitute "doing business. ' 56 The court criticized the respondents for asserting that "doing business" or "transacting business" must be construed to include every act done by a corporation
of a business nature. 57 It said that more was required: continuity of
transactions and a "purpose of engaging generally in the carrying
on" of business in the state.5 s This decision was later reinforced by
an agent of such corporation upon whom any such process, notice, or demand may be served.....
Whenever a claim shall arise out of business transacted In this state
by a foreign corporation transacting business without a certificate of authority, service of process may be made upon any person who shall be found within
this state acting as an agent of, or doing business for, such corporation, or
by mailing a copy thereof to the defendant corporation by registered or certified mail at its last known post office address.
52. "Transacting business" and "doing business" are apparently synonymous. Isaacs,
supra note 28, at 1024-25, distinguished three degrees of "doing business": (1) the least
degree is that permitting service of process in a suit against a foreign corporation if the
business conducted is "of such a character as to warrant the inference that the corporation is present in the jurisdiction where service Is attempted ;" (2) a higher degree Is necessary to subject such a corporation to a tax on its activity within the forum state; and
(3) still a higher degree is needed for application of statutes requiring qualification in
the state, as where the activities of the corporation indicate a purpose of regularly transacting business therein.
53. Note, supra note 1, at 329.
54. Id.
55. See Scranton Grain Co. v. Lubbock Machine & Supply Co., 167 N.W.2d 748, 753
(N.D. 1969), discussed infra, wherein the North Dakota Supreme Court said that the
legislative assembly, in adopting the long-arm statute in 1969, had realized "that our
present statutes providing for service upon foreign corporations are not so broad in their
scope as are the statutes or rules of procedure in other jurisdictions."
56. State v. Robb-Lawrence Co., 15 N.D. 55, 106 N.W. 406 (1906).
57. Id. at 59, 106 N.W. at 408.
58. Id. at 60, 106 N.W. at 408.
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Cooper v. E.L. Welch Co., 50 a federal circuit court case, and Briorschi-Minuti Co. v. Elson-Williams Const. Co. 60
2.

Solicitation

The issue of solicitation arose in 1920 in Dahl Implement & Lumber Co. v. Campbell.6 It was held that where a foreign corporation
that had its main office in a South Dakota town near the North Dakota line was shown to have solicited business generally in tributary
territory in North Dakota, any transaction consummated by it in advancement of its business was not an isolated transaction. According
to the court:
While it is true that . . . an isolated transaction does not
amount to a doing -of business, it is also true that, where an
ordinary pursuit of business is shown, no exception is made2
in favor of what may be the first transaction consummated.
Solicitation questions arose again in Wheeler v. Boyer FireApparatus Co. 63 and Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc."
In Wheeler, the appellant claimed that since the contracts or orders
procured by its agent in North Dakota were subject to approval of
the home office in Logansport, Indiana, service of process upon the
agent was inadequate. The court, in sustaining jurisdiction, relied
upon International Harverster Co. v. Kentucky, 65 in which jurisdiction was upheld where machine orders were solicited by International
Harvester in Kentucky, but sent to another state for approval.
The court also upheld jurisdiction in Ellsworth, where service of
process in a libel action was made upon a representative of Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc. 6 The court noted that the company
had been sending copies of its law directory to North Dakota since
1890 and that its representative 7 not only took subscriptions for the
law directory,6 8 but also gathered information for the publication and
59. 218 F. 719 (8th Cir. 1914). It held that a Minnesota corporation that did no business in North Dakota except soliciting orders for grain to be shipped to its place of business in Minnesota could not be sued in North Dakota, even though the corporation had
attempted to comply with the state corporation statute by filing with the secretary of
state a power of attorney appointing the secretary as its attorney to receive service of
process in all actions against it in the state. Id. at 720.
60. 41 N.D. 628, 172 N.W. 239 (1919).
61. 45 N.D. 239, 178 N.W. 197 (1920).
62. Id. at 243, 178 N.W. at 199.
63. 63 N.D. 403, 248 N.W. 521. (1933).
64. 65 N.D. 297, 258 N.W. 486 (1935).
65. 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
66. The libel action was brought by a long-time state resident engaged in the practice
of law, but the court's opinion did not state the nature of the alleged libel. Ellsworth v.
Martindale-Hubbel Law Directory, 65 N.D. 297, 258 N.W. 486 (1935).
67. The representative was served with process in North Dakota. He, like other company representatives, was allotted a specified territory. He called upon the members of
the bar and solicited their business, but subscriptions and advertising obtained by him
were not binding upon the company until accepted by it at its New York office. Id. t
299, 258 N.W. at 486-87.
68. The law directory included information relating to the rating of lawyers, the date
of their admission to the bar, their estimated legal ability and character, their estimated
financial worth and their promptness in paying their bills. Id. at 299, 258 N.W. at 486.

,NOTES
collected accounts. Said the court: "The case is not where there was
merely an occasional and infrequent business transaction in North
Dakota. So it seems to us that the defendant was doing business in
this state. ...

"69

A federal court distinguished Wheeler and Ellsworth in the 1950
case of Anderson v. Page & Hill Homes, Inc. 7 0° where the defendant
Minnesota corporation employed a representative who resided in Minneapolis, but who traveled through the Dakotas for the purpose of
establishing dealer-builders. He was without authority to approve orders or dealer-builder contracts, make contracts, or legally commit
the corporation in any other way. The court declined to sustain jurisdiction, arguing that the mere solicitation of business in the state by
the corporation was not "doing business" in such a way as to make
7
it amenable to service of process. 1

B.

JURISDICTIONAL HESITANCY

Several decisions by the state supreme court shortly before the
enactment of the long-arm statute demonstrated a clear reluctance
to extend in personam jurisdiction because of the absence of a longarm statute in the state.
In Fisher v. Mon Dak Truck Ldnes, Inc.,7 2 the appellant, the
widow of a man killed in a 1966 accident involving a truck manufactured by a nonresident corporation that subsequently merged with
another nonresident corporation had sought to obtain jurisdiction over
the corporations by service of process upon the manager of two North
Dakota businesses that sold the corporations' trucks. The court held
that such service was inadequate to warrant jurisdiction because the
North Dakota firms' only connection'with the foreign corporations
was that they sold the corporations' products. 7 3 It also held that such
service could not be obtained either by mail7 4 or by the state's non-

resident motorist statute.7 5 In its decision, the court noted that neither

69. Id. at 307, 258 N.W. at 490.
70. 88 P. Supp. 408 (D.N.D. 1950).
71. Id. at 413.
72. 166 N.W.2d 371 (N.D. 1969).
78. Id. at 374.
74. Such service apparently was attempted under the Business Corporation Act, but the
court said such service could not be valid unless it was shown that the defendants had
been transacting business in North Dakota, and the claim of the plaintiff arose out of
such transaction. Id.
75. The court said that the nonresident motorist statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-11
(1972), did not apply because neither of the foreign corporations used the state's highways or operated the motor vehicle in question upon the highways at the time of the
accident. The statute provides in part:
The use and, operation by a resident of this state or his agent, or by a nonresident or his agent, of a motor vehicle upon or over the highways of this
state shall be deemed an appointment by such resident when he has been
absent from this state continuously for six months or more following an
accident

or by such nonresident

at any time, of the highway commissioner

of this state to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all
legal process in any action or proceeding against him growing out of the use

194
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of the foreign corporations had at any time maintained a warehouse
76
or had employees in the state.
Although the appellant emphasized InternationalShoe in its argument, the court took what appears to be a narrow reading of that
decision in light of the general consensus that it served to greatly
expand the concept of long-arm jurisdiction. 7 Declared the court:
"Whether the United States Supreme Court would have held that International Shoe was doing business within the State of Washington
so that service of process could be made on it for any purpose other
than imposition of the unemployment tax is not determined. ' 7 The
court also distinguished two other cases 79 relied upon by the appellant, and concluded:
The foreign corporations attempted to be served in this
case conducted no activity in the State of North Dakota except to ship products into the State in response to orders sent
to them by a local dealer. One of such corporations occasionally did send an employee into the State to call on the local
dealer to encourage sales, but such foreign corporations had
absolutely no control or authority over the local concern. This
did not constitute "doing business" in the State of North Dakota so as to subject such foreign corporation to service of
process in this State. 0
There then followed a series of three cases involving the
Scranton Grain Company of Scranton, North Dakota, which had
brought an action against several defendants. At the center of the
litigation was a defective fuel pump that allegedly was partly responsible for a 1961 explosion that damaged the Scranton Grain Company's elevators and their contents. The fuel pump had been manufactured by foreign corporate defendants Roper Hydraulics, Inc., and
Roper Industries, Inc., and sold to the Fargo Foundry Company of
Fargo, North Dakota. Fargo Foundry in turn sold the pump to Carl
J. Austad & Son, which was unloading propane gas near the plaintiff's elevators 4 when the explosion occurred.
or operation of the motor vehicle resulting in damage or loss to person or
property ... and such use or operation shall constitute an agreement that
such process in any action against him shall have the same legal force and
effect as if served upon him personally....
76. 166 N.W.2d at 374.
77. For a contrary view regarding the importance of International Shoe, see L. D.
Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 1969), where the
court said that International Shoe stands for the proposition that reasonableness is the
test by which to measure whether the demands of due process are met in cases where a
foreign corporation has contacts with the forum.
78. 166 N.W.2d at 376.
79. The cases were 501 DeMers, Inc. v. Fink, 148 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1967), and Szantay
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965), aff'd 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1965). The court distinguished 501 DeMers on the ground that the defendants had been
operating three parking lots in North Dakota, and Szantay was distinguished because in
that the case the defendants exercised complete control over the operation that caused the
harm to the plaintiff's decedent.
80. 166 N.W.2d at 376-77.
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In the first case of Scranton Grain Co. v. Lubbock Machine &
Supply Co.,8l the court upheld dismissal of jurisdiction, using the
same reasoning that it had employed in Fisher. Although the Roper
defendants employed a sales manager to use his best efforts to promote the sale of Roper products in a four-state area, including North
Dakota, and to appoint, train, and develop distributors in that area,
the court held that there was no evidence to indicate that the defendants possessed any control or authority over the local distributors
of their products.8 2 Hence, they were deemed not to be "doing business" in the state and not amenable to service of process. 83
The second Scranton case 4 involved certified jurisdictional questions,86 which the court refused to answer pending further proceedings in the trial court.8 6 The final Scranton decision,8 7 which was
handed down about two years after the long-arin statute had taken
effect, declared that the long-arm statute was only to apply prospectively and had no retroactive application because the statute did
not contain a "savings clause"8 8 that would give it retroactive effect.
C.

SUMMARY

North Dakota's experience with long-arm jurisdiction has been
limited by the fact that the state supreme court has not decided a
case interpreting the scope of the state's long-arm statute. But a review of the cases discussed above and other decisions leads to some
general conclusions about the scope of pre-1969 jurisdiction over foreign corporations. They are:
1. The Business Corporation Act was not construed as a longarm statute. 9
2. Single transactions were not considered to fall within the
meaning of "doing business." 90
3. Service of process had to be made within the state upon the
foreign corporation, or upon some person authorized to accept service in its behalf.91
81. 167 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1969).
82. Id. at 751.
83. Id. at 753.
84. Scranton Grain Co. v. Lubbock Machine & Supply Co., 175 N.W.2d 656 (N.D. 1970).
85. The questions related to the issue of jurisdiction over defendants Lubbock Machine
& Supply Company and Lubbock Manufacturing Company, whose motion contesting district
court jurisdiction had been denied. The Judge who denied their motion was not the same
judge who granted a similar motion by the defendants in the first Scranton case.
86. The court said that the jurisdictional questions could not be answered until they
had first been presented to and ruled upon by the trial court. 175 N.W.2d at 657-58.
87. Scranton Grain Co. v. Lubbock Machine & Supply, 186 N.W.2d 449 (N.D. 1971).
88. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-10 (1975) reads: "No part of this code is retroactive unless
expressly declared to be so."
89. Note, supra note 1, at 329.
90. See, e.g., State v. Robb-Lawrence Co., 15 N.D. 55, 106 N.W. 406 (1906).
91. See in this respect Kluver v. Middlewest Grain Co., 44 N.D. 210, 173 N.W. 468
(1919), which involved the alleged conversion by the defendant, a Minnesota corporation,
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4. Plaintiffs were denied a remedy where the foreign corporation did not own property in the state or the cause of action did not
92
arise in the state.
5. Solictation coupled with other activities such as collecting payments was sufficient to constitute "doing business," in which event
jurisdiction was upheld. 3
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LONG-ARM STATUTE IN NORTH
DAKOTA
A.

FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATION

While the pre-1969 decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court
were generaly conservative, the court noted in the first Scranton
case that Senate Bill 412 was shortly to take effect as the state longarm statute. Said the court: "This Act, when it becomes effective
, . . will broaden the jurisdiction of our courts over nonresidents
transacting business in this State and permit service of process upon
nonresidents previously exempt under our law.""
After the three Scranton cases and Fisher were decided, there
arose in United States District Court three notable tests of the longarm statute. All of these decisions were rendered after the statute
had been incorporated into the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

Jurisdictional Contacts

The first case was Keller v. Clark Equipment Co.9 5 One of the
defendants in the action, Clark Equipment A. G., a wholly owned
foreign subsidiary of Clark Equipment Company, sought dismissal
of the action against it or, in the alternative, the quashing of service on the ground that it was a corporation organized under the laws
of more than 300 bushels of the plaintiff's wheat. The summons and complaint were
served upon Jourgen Olson, a Minot resident. The plaintiff claimed that Olson was the
president of the defendant company, but the court agreed with the conclusions of the
trial court that the evidence did not show that Olson was an officer or agent of the defendant at the time of service of process. The court said that service "must be exercised
so as not to encroach upon the elementary principle of jurisprudence that a court of justice cannot acquire jurisdiction to render personal judgment except by actual service of
process within its jurisdiction upon the defendant, or some one authorized to accept service
In his behalf, or by his waiver of due service." Id. at 219, 173 N.W. at 471.
92. See Brevick v. Cunard S. S. Co., 63 N.D. 210, 247 N.W. 373 (1933). Brevick had
brought an action to recover for damages allegedly sustained on a trip to Europe. He
claimed that the defendant had made misrepresentations when he purchased his steamship
ticket, and, as a result, he was unable to see those parts of Europe he had wanted to see.
The court found no basis for Jurisdiction because the alleged cause of action arose in
Europe, not in North Dakota, and because Brevick made no claim that the steamship
company had any property in the state. The controlling statute provided that service
could not be made upon a foreign corporation unless it had property in the state Or the
cause of action arose therein.
93. See, eg., Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 65 N.D. 297, 258 N.W.
486 (1935) ;Wheeler v. Boyer Fire Apparatus Co., 63 N.D. 403, 248 N.W. 521 (1933).
94. 167 N.W.2d at 753.
95. 367 F. Supp. 1350 (D.N.D. 1973).
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of Switzerland and therefore not subject to service in North Dakota.
The parent company, Clark Equipment, was a Delaware corporation.
Service of process on Clark A. G. was effected pursuant to Rule
4 (d) (7)96 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by serving the summons and complaint upon an officer of Clark Equipment at its Melroe Division in Gwinner, North Dakota. At the hub of the litigation
was a patent licensing agreement.
In defense, Clark A. G. claimed that the plaintiff did not show
facts that established court jurisdiction or proper service. The court,
however, found no decisive merit in this claim, holding that the defendant had a sufficient connection with North Dakota to justify
jurisdiction, even though only a single contract was at issue. 97 Contacts cited by the court as adequate for jurisdiction included the fact
that Clark A. G. maintained a liaison engineering employee in the
state and that the plaintiffs were likely contacted, in regard to the
patents, by a person representing the defendant. 98 Therefore, even
though Clark A. G. was not "doing business" in the state, 99 the court
concluded that "Clark Equipment and Clark A. G. were inextricably
involved with [the plaintiffs] in the negotiations and execution of
the patenting licensing agreements, and that Clark A. G. comes within the minimum contacts rule."' 100
The court also refused to accept the allegation that service upon
Melroe was invalid as against Clark A. G. It held that the evidence
showed that Clark A. G. had received adequate notice by service upon
a division of the parent company. 1 1 To not allow jurisdiction in this
case, according to the court, "would force the [plaintiffs] to bring suit
in Switzerland, since no other United States forum would have any
10 2
greater nexus with the plaintiffs or the issues than North Dakota.'
Unlike the state supreme court, which had read International
Shoe in a narrow light, the federal district court emphasized that
decision's "fair play and substantial justice" test as a basis for departing from the traditional rules for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 1 3 The court also emphasized the broad interpretation afforded Minnesota's long-arm statute permitting jurisdiction
over any case in which the state has a reasonable interest in offering
a remedy. 1 4
96. Service under the federal rule was upon reliance of the North Dakota long-arm
statute.
97. 367 F. Supp. at 1354.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1355.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1352-53.
104. Id. at 1854. Cited by the court as an example of a case broadly interpreting Minnesota's statute was United Barge Co. v. Logan Charter Service, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 624
(D. Minn. 1964).
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In Vasquez v. Falcon Coach Co., Inc., 0 5 decided a year after
Keller, the same district court again sustained jurisdiction where a
North Dakota mobile home purchaser sued a Kansas company for
alleged negligence in the manufacture of the home and for breach
of express and implied warranties. The contacts cited by the court as
adequate for jurisdiction included the following: (1) the defendant
admitted that it delivered its products to the state, apparently using
its own trucks for delivery to dealers; (2) "trouble shooter" repairmen were available who sometimes performed repair work; (3) the
defendant solicited business from dealers in the state through visiting sales representatives even though it did not deal directly with
the ultimate purchaser; and (4) several products made by the defendant were utilized by North Dakotans as homes. 0 6 The defendant had
alleged that there could be no jurisdiction because it merely delivered its goods to North Dakota and performed isolated repair work
in the state; it also had claimed that it maintained no office in the
state, did not directly solicit business, did no installation or construction work, entered into n6 contracts or finance transactions,
and neither owned nor supported any stock or goods in North Da0 7
kota .
As in Keller, the court emphasized the holding in International
Shoe, saying that it "set broad guidelines not limited to the facts of
the case."' 10 8 The defendant's position that Hanson v. Denckla supported its motion to quash service was ignored by the court on the
ground that Hanson was so decided only because the Supreme Court
could find no activity on the part of the defendant to sustain jurisdiction. 10 9 In its discussion of North Dakota's long-arm statute, the
federal court said:
[T]he rule is couched in terms of "contacts" and not in
terms of "doing business." It is also noteworthy that a contract with the aggrieved person is not necessary to base service upon a foreign corporation; rather the act authorizes "jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as
to any claim for relief arising from the person's . . . supplying services, goods, or other things in this state." 1 '
a.

Contracts with Insufficient Nexus to Forum

In the third case, Shern v. Tractor Supply Company of Grand
Forks,"" the same federal court refused to allow jurisdiction over
the defendant on the basis of a contract that did not involve North
105. 376 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.D. 1974).
106. Id. at 819-20.
107. Id. at 816.
108. Id. at 818.
109. Id. at 819.
110. Id. at 822.
111. 381 F. Supp. 1331 (D.N.D. 1974).
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Dakota residents and was to be wholly performed outside the state.
The plaintiff, a resident of Minnesota, had entered into a contest that
promised the winner a three-month cruise on the S. S. President Wilson, a vessel owned by the defendant, American President Line, of
San Francisco, California. He alleged that in reliance upon the representations made by American and another defendant, Tractor Supply
Company, he registered for the contest, and was subsequently notified in late November, 1972, that he had won the contest and was
entitled to the cruise. The plaintiff told the defendants that he could
not arrange his personal affairs in the short time remaining between
the notification of his success in the contest and the time that the
cruise was to begin. He alleged that the defendants failed to offer a
fair, reasonable, or legitimate alternative to the cruise, substituting
trips for much shorter periods aboard cargo ships that sailed not
12
the world but only the Pacific.1
American alleged that it had no contacts with North Dakota sufficient to constitute "doing business" in the state. Although the court
said that the defendant's reliance on a "doing business" concept was
misplaced," 3 it agreed that the contracts were insufficient. Cited by
the court in support of its position were the facts that the contract
was between nonresidents, that there were no prior negotiations in
the state regarding the terms of the contract, and that the obligations
of the contract were not to be performed in North, Dakota. 11 4 Said the
court:
To construe North Dakota's long-arm statute as allowing an
assertion of jurisdiction in this action where no obligations of
the contract were to be performed in the state, and no other
consequences concerning the state exist, would set up Rule
4 (b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure for a con-5
stitutional attack as violating the standards of due process."
B.

LIBERAL VIEW

It seems quite clear from the discussion of the above federal
cases that the federal district court, where it had opportunity to do
so, has interpreted quite broadly North Dakota's long-arm statute as
incorporated into the Rules of Civil Procedure. In Keller, it was
held that a single contract is a basis for jurisdiction if the plaintiff can show something more than the mere making of a contract in North Dakota. In Vasquez, it was held that the sale of mobile
homes to North Dakota dealers, the delivery of mobile homes to the
state, and the usage of those homes by North Dakota residents were
among contacts adequate to support jurisdiction since they extend112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id. at 1336-37.
Id. at 1338.
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ed the benefits, protections, and obligations of North Dakota laws
to the defendant.
While Shern was a victory for the defendant, it cannot be said to
have imposed any oppressive restrictions on the breadth of the longarm statute. Indeed, the decision is notable for what it says about
Rule 4 (b) (2) and modern thinking about extended in personam jurisdiction: "The rule is couched in terms of 'contacts' and not in

terms of 'doing business'

"; 116

"[A]

single tortious act or a single

contract may constitute a sufficient contact. . . . ",;17 "The facts
of the specific case will often be determinative of whether the
1 s
single act or contract will serve as a viable basis for jurisdiction."'
Certainly the federal court's holdings go considerably beyond
the decisions of the state supreme court prior to the adoption of the
statute, and some may question whether the federal court's view
of the long-arm statute is perhaps too broad. However, its interpretations do not appear overly expansive when compared to interpretations given long-arm statutes in other states, including those states
that neighbor North Dakota.
C.

How NORTH DAKOTA'S DECISIONS COMPARE

In South Dakota, the supreme court has on several occasions
9
construed that state's long-arm statute," which is very similar to
North Dakota's.
In Ventling v. Kraft, 2 ) the South Dakota Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction on the basis of a contract that a North Dakota resident
had executed in South Dakota. The court said that the North Dakotan had availed himself of the protection and benefits of South Dakota
law, adding that the long-arm statute was to be construed to gain
"the fullest benefits from the United States Supreme Court cases.
116. Id. at 1334, citing Vasquez v. Falcon Coach Co., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 815, 822 (D.N.D.
1974).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. S.D. COMP. LAws § 15-7-2 (1967) reads:
Any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
cause of action arising from the doing personally, through any employee, or
through an agent, of any of the following acts:
(1)
The transaction of any business within the state;
(2) The commission of any act which results in accrual within this
state of aLtort action ;
The ownership, use, or possession of any property, or of any
(3)
interest therein, situated within this state;
Contracting to Insure any person, property, or risk located within
(4)
this state at the time of contracting;
Entering Into a contract for services to be rendered or for ma(5)
terials to be furnished in this state by such person; or
(6) Acting as director, manager, trustee, or other officer of any corporation organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within this state, or as executor or administrator of any estate within
this state.
120. 83 S.D. 465, 161 N.W.2d 29 (1968).
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in which the due process requirements under the Federal Constitution have relaxed as they pertain to personal jurisdiction in civil
21
actions."
In Kelley v. Duling Enterprises, Inc. 1 22 the South Dakota Board
of Optometry sought to enjoin allegedly illegal conduct by the defendant. Among the alleged illegal activities were unlawful advertising and the "capping and steering" of persons to certain optometrists under alleged arrangements and agreements. Said the court:
Duling Enterprises, Inc., directly contracted for and controlled advertising signs which it caused to be erected in South
Dakota under a contract with a sign company. It also contracted for and arranged for broadcasting of its advertisements
over Radio station WNAX from the studios of Yankton, South
Dakota. It had sufficient contacts with the State 2 3of South
Dakota to subject it to the jurisdiction of this state.
Liberal construction has also been given to Minnesota's longarm statute. 12 4 In Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 25 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in spite of allegations that there could be no jurisdiction because
the tort had not occurred wholly in Minnesota. Nine years later, the
Eighth Circuit court held that where there was a tortious injury arising out of a contract to be performed wholly or in part in Minnesota, the in personam jurisdiction of that state over a Texas corpora12 6
tion was valid.
Decisions in states farther removed from North Dakota than
Minnesota and South Dakota have produced similar, liberal interpretations of long-arm statutes. For example, in Ohio the failure of
a father to provide child support payments under the Illinois Paternity Act 27 was deemed a tortious act within the meaning of the I1121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 474, 161 N.W.2d at 33-84.
84 S.D. 427, 172 N.W.2d 727 (1970).
Id. at 448, 172 N.W.2d at 738.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(1) (3) (1969) covers corporations. It provides:
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to
be performed in whole or In part by either party in Minnesota, Or If such
foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Minnesota against
a resident of Minnesota, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in
Minnesota by the foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the
appointment by the foreign corporation of the secretary of the state of Minnesota and his successors to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may
be served all lawful process in any action or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract or tort ...
The making of the contract or the committing of the tort shall be deemed
to be the agreement of the foreign corporation that any process against
It which is so served upon the secretary of state shall be of the same legal
force and effect as if served personally within the state of Minnesota.
125. 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
126. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969).
127. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106%, § 52 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970) states: "The father of a
child born out of wedlock whose paternity is established in a proceeding under this Act
shall be liable for its support, maintenance, education and welfare, until the child's attainment'of age 18 .. "
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linois long-arm statute,' 2 8 thus permitting service on the father in
Ohio.12 9 Iii Illinois, that state's supreme court upheld jurisdiction over
a Wisconsin defendant who sent one of his employees to Illinois to
deliver some appliances when the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the employee in unloading a stove. 130
D. SUMMARY
It is clear that the federal court decisions applying North Dakota's long-arm statute produced much more liberal results than
the state supreme court cases prior to 1969. But this does not mean
that the supreme court, when it does hear arguments in a case involving the statute, will construe the statute narrowly. Indeed, there
are several possible reasons why the court construed jurisdiction
narrowly in decisions made before adoption of the long-arm statute.
First, some statutory authority must exist before a state can
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 18 ' Therefore, it
may be argued that Fisher, Scranton and earlier cases were adverse to extended jurisdiction because the state had no long-arm statute upon which such jurisdiction could be based. Second, the Business Corporation Act, even if it had been construed as a long-arm
statute, would likely have proven inadequate for the task. Indeed,
one of the provisions of the statute specifies acts of a foreign corporation that are not to be considered the "transacting of business"
in the state.'32 Third, courts remain conscious of the bounds of their
jurisdiction even if there is a long-arm statute. The Supreme Court
has said that restrictions on state jurisdiction are "more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are
a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective states."' 8 3
V. HOW EXPANSIVE SHOULD JURISDICTION BE?
A.

CHANGING

CONCEPT

The whole concept of statutory in personam jurisdiction over
nonresidents and foreign corporations has undergone, and continues
to experience, significant change. State court decisions that would
not have withstood the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court
40 to 50 years ago are not considered violative of due process today.
129. Poindexter v. Willis, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 157 (Montgomery County C.P. 1970), noted 4n
40 U. Cmn. L. REv. 183 (1971).
130. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Il1.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
131. Cummins, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product
Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. Rv.1028, 1035 (1935).
182. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-01 (1974).
133. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).

NOTES

Jurisdiction can now be based not only upon the classical bases-presence, consent, appearance-but also upon conduct
such as transacting business, contracting to supply goods,
causing tortious consequences, owning property,
and insur34
ing persons and property within the state.
An example of modern legal thinking regarding long-arm jurisdiction is Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,3 5
which had facts somewhat like those in the first and third Scranton
cases. In Gray, the defendant was an Ohio manufacturer of water
heater safety valves. A Pennsylvania company used the valves in
assembling water heaters. One of the heaters sent to the forum, Illinois, caused the injury to the plaintiff. The Illinois court sustained
jurisdiction over the valve manufacturer despite its rather remote
36
nexus with the forum.
B.

INTERPRETING SCOPE IN NORTH DAKOTA

The North Dakota long-arm statute is, like long-arm statutes in
other states, quite broad in terms of its language, which creates interpretational problems. For example, it provides for personal jurisdiction over any person (including a corporation) in a claim arising from "transacting business in this state.' 1 37 What does "transacting business" mean? Although no precise definition has been
given, apparently "transacting business" requires an intentional
act of some significance in the forum state. In one case, it was said
that there must be an act by the defendant that produces an effect in
the forum state so as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. 138
The North Dakota statute also provides for in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant "contracting to supply or supplying services, goods, or other things in this state."' 3 9 The decisions of
the federal court in Keller and Shern indicate that such a provision
will be interpreted liberally if there was an intentional act that produced an injury in the forum state that should be remedied. There
is a provision in the long-arm statute that specifically places insur4
ance contracts within the reach of in personam jurisdiction. 1
Another provision allows jurisdiction over a nonresident or foreign corporation "owning, having any interest in, using, or possessing property in this state.' 4' Provisions such as this have been sub134. Note,
L. Ra,. 1105
135. 22 fIl.
136. Id. at

Retroactive Expansion of State Court Jurisdiction Over Persons, 63 COLUM.
(1963) (footnotes omitted).
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
444, 176 N.E.2d at 767.

137. N.D.R. Crv. P. 4(b)(2)(A).
138. Belmont Industries, Inc. v.
281, 107 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1973).
139. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b) (2) (B).
140.
141.

N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b) (2) (F).
N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b) (2) (E).

Superior Court of Stanislaus

County, 31

CaL App.

3d
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jected to criticism on the ground that the presence of property in a
state does not give the state power over the nonresident owner. According to one critic, a state
has power over the property and a proceeding in rem can be
brought against the property. The owner is subject to the law
of the state where he is physically located ....

The attempt to

apply [a long-arm statute] to the out-of-state owner is an extraterritorial application of the statute contrary to due process
of law. Furthermore, it is unnecessary since an action for
any injury arising from
the property can be brought in rem
14 2
against the property.

Other language in the statute provides for jurisdiction over nonresidents and foreign corporations "committing a tort within or without this state causing injury to another person or property within
this state' ' 4 3 or "committing a tort within this state causing injury
to another person or property within or without this state. ' 1 4 4 The

first of these provisions appears to be directed toward litigation involving such issues as product liability. It has been said that such provisions
should be liberally construed to achieve their intended objective. Assuming the various state legislatures intended to confer the maximum jurisdictional powers on their courts that
will comport with due process limitations, a suggested approach to interpretation of the statutes is to direct attention
to the three causal elements which are essential to the manufacturer's liability: the defective manufacture, the distribution of the product to the purchaser, and the resulting injury.
For example, viewed in this manner, it seems apparent that
the shipment of a product to the forum is an act committed
by the defendant. If there is an intermediate distributor who
is also a nonresident, his activity is but a continuation of the
defendant's act of shipment. Using similar reasoning, the
negligent manufacture and the resultant injury are also acts
which, if occurring in the forum state, would sustain jurisdiction. All three elements, i.e., manufacture, distribution, and
injury, are parts of the tort, for they represent phases of
the continuum of events leading to the cause of action. While
a court's interpretation of a statute should reflect legislative
policy toward subjecting a nonresident to suit, unnecessarily
restrictive results have occurred 5 all too often that could have
been avoided by this approach.''

VI. CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction of state courts over nonresidents and foreign corporations has expanded greatly in the latter part of the twentieth
142. Stimson, Omnibus Statutes Designed
fendants, 48 A.B.A.J. 725, 727 (1962).
143. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b)(2)(C).
144. N.D.R. C-v. P. 4(b)(2)(D).
145. Cummins, supra note 131, at 1036.

to Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State

De-
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century, and a number of grounds are now considered adequate for
the exercise of such jurisdiction. It appears that new tests of jurisdiction will have to 'be developed as our society becomes increasingly complex and corporations become larger and more powerful. However, such a task will not be without difficulty and delay. As one writer
has noted: "The shifting basis upon which jurisdictional power has
been grounded in the transitive process have made the subject most
prolific in litigation, particularly with respect to the foreign corporations, whose rapid and steady growth of operations have tended to
work an effacement of state boundaries.' ' 4
The long-arm statute in North Dakota is similar to long-arm statutes in other states, but because it has been in effect for a relatively
short time, it has been subjected to only a few tests, all in the same
federal court. While the decisions of the federal court give the statute a broad construction, no decisions interpreting its applicability
have yet been rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court, which
in cases decided before the adoption of the statute took a narrow jurisdictional view.
The North Dakota statute should be interpreted to the extent
necessary to afford maximum protection to the state's residents, yet
not violate the fourteenth amendment due process rights of the defendants. However, due process requirements have been in a state
of continual flux, and what is considered a violation of due process
today may in the future be held within the bounds of due process.
Therefore, there should be a balancing test, weighing the desirability
of a remedy for the plaintiff against possible unfairness to the de147
fendant.
ADDENDUM
Since the writing of this article, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has issued an order-4 amending Rule 4 of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure. The amended rule, promulgated in response
to a petition signed by members of the State Bar Association from
each of the state's six judicial districts, will take effect on January 1,
1976. The court order embodies rule changes that the court deemed
appropriate after consideration of proposed changes.
146. Wilson, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents, "An Invitation and a Proposal,"
9 BAYLOR L. REV. 363, 364 (1957).
147. Mention should be made of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which is the discretionary power of a court to refuse to exercise Jurisdiction when it appears that the
cause before it should be tried elsewhere. Factors to be considered in deciding whether to
utilize it include availability of the witnesses, the dispositive law that will govern the
case, ease of access to proof sources, and other factors that speed the disposition of a
case and reduce its cost. Use of the doctrine could minimize some of the adverse effects
of expanded in personam jurisdiction. For a discussion of this doctrine, see Barrett, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALiF. L. REv. 880 (1947).
148. Order of the North Dakota Supreme Court, September 2, 1975.
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One of the amendments is a new long-arm statute provision, 14 9
which must be read in para materia with the jurisdictional bases' 0
that were not altered by the amendments. The new provision serves
to broaden the long-arm statute by allowing a state court to exercise
jurisdiction over a person acting directly, or through an agent, 51 who
is "enjoying any. . . status or capacity [other than a status or capacity previously specified] within this state, including cohabitation,
or engaging in any other activity having such contact with this state
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him does not offend
against traditional notions of justice or fair play or the due process
152
of law."'
Rule 4 (b) (2) (3) ,'153 which also remains unchanged, provides that
if jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon the long-arm statute,
"only a claim for relief arising from bases enumerated therein
may be asserted against him.' ' 1 54 Therefore, the language of the new
provision is significant because it potentially expands the circumstances that may warrant the exercise of state court jurisdiction. Its
language is considerably broader than the language used to describe
the other rather specific contacts upon which personal jurisdiction
may be based. As a test for sustaining jurisdiction, the provision apparently applies to "fair play and substantial justice" approach applied by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington. 55
Several other amendments to Rule 4 should be noted because of
their relationship to the issue of long-arm jurisdiction. The definition
of "person" was slightly modified in Rule 4 (a) ,156 and Rule 4 (b) (5)"5,
is a new provision recognizing the concept of the inconvenient
forum. It provides: "If the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court
may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any condition
that may be just."
GARY

R. WOLBERG

149. N.D.R. Crv. P. 4(b) (2) (H) (effective January 1, 1976).
150. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b) (2) (A-G) supra at note 3.
151. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b)(2)
152. N.D.R. Cirv. P. 4(b) (2) (H) (effective January 1, 1976).
153. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b) (2) (3).
154. Id.
155. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
156. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(a) (effective January 1, 1976). It reads: "As used in this rule,
'person,' whether Or not a citizen of domiciliary of this state, and whether or not organized under the laws of this state, includes: an individual, his executor, administrator
Joint or common interest; a partnership, an association; a corporation; and any other legal
or commercial entity."
157. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b) (5) (effective January 1, 1976). See aLso note 147, aupra.

